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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105
(2006).
LAW: Unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums fall
outside the priority allowed under section 507(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code for contributions to employee benefit plans arising
from services rendered.
FACTS: The Bankruptcy Code accords priorities to unsecured
creditors' claims for unpaid wages, salaries, commissions and for
unpaid contributions to employee benefit plans. Howard Delivery
Service, Inc. ("Howard") was required to provide workers'
compensation coverage to its employees. Howard contracted with
respondent Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") to
provide this insurance for Howard's companies in ten different states.
After Howard filed a bankruptcy petition, Zurich filed an unsecured
creditor's claim for $400,000 in premiums, claiming that they
qualified as contributions to an employee benefit plan. They further
claimed these contributions were entitled to priority under section
507(a)(5). The bankruptcy court denied priority status to the claim,
and the district court affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit panel reversed.
ANALYSIS: Insurance carriers' claims for unpaid workers'
compensation premiums owed by an employer fall outside the scope
of section 507(a)(5). The premiums paid for workers' compensation
insurance are more closely aligned with premiums paid for
automotive, fire or theft insurance, rather than contributions made to
secure employee fringe benefits under pension plans and disability
insurance which are covered under section 507(a)(5).
Congress enacted section 507(a)(5) granting priority to plan
providers to recover unpaid premiums after employees' claims for
wages have been paid. Employees can recover up to $10,000 for
benefit plan contributions and wage claims.
The Court focused on the difference between workers'
compensation regimes which protects the insured enterprise, while
employer sponsored fringe benefit plans only protect the employee or
his survivor. Additionally, workers' compensation plans provide a
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trade off where employees are assured limited fixed payments for job
related accidents, and employers are shielded from large judgments
and expensive tort litigation costs. Thus, section 507(a)(5) priority
provisions must be narrowly construed to provide equal and fair
distribution among creditors.
HOLDING: The appellate court's judgment is reversed and
remanded.
IMPACT: Allowing section 507(a)(5)'s preference provision to
apply to workers' compensation carriers could result in a dramatic
decrease in the amount available to cover unpaid contributions to
plans which truly qualify as wage claims. Thus, this decision will
guarantee that recovery amounts under true wage claims will not be
diluted.
Empire HealthChoice Assurance. Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct.
2121 (2006).
LAW: Reimbursement of an out-of-state court tort suit settlement
stemming from injuries sustained by a federal employee are to be
resolved in state court.
FACTS: The Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") negotiates
and regulates health benefit plans for federal employees under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 ("FEHBA").
FEHBA contains a preemption provision stating that federal district
courts have original jurisdiction over health insurance claims against
the United States. Additionally, FEHBA obligates the insurer to
make reasonable efforts to recover amounts paid for medical care. It
also alerts enrollees that medical expenses recovered from anyone
other than the insured were to be used to reimburse the plan for
benefits paid.
OPM contracted with Blue Cross to provide a nationwide
plan administered by local companies such as Empire HealthChoice
Assurance, Inc. ("Empire"). This case stems from a state court tort
action brought by McVeigh, a former plan enrollee, against third
parties for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the medical
care costs it paid to McVeigh. Empire argued that its contract-
derived reimbursement claim involved unique federal interests
26-2
because (1) reimbursement directly affects the U.S. Treasury, and (2)
Congress expressed interest in maintaining uniformity among the
States regarding federal health plan benefits.
The district court rejected Empire's arguments and granted
McVeigh's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit affirmed.
ANALYSIS: In this case, there was no express federal right of action
allowing insurers to sue health care beneficiaries in federal court for
reimbursement under FEHBA contracts. Reimbursement rights
stemming from proceeds of state court personal injury actions are
usually resolved in state courts.
Additionally, this action did not fall under the section 1331
exception, where federal law is a necessary element of the claim for
relief. Here, there was no significant conflict between an identifiable
federal interest and state law; thus, there was no reason to lodge this
case in federal court.
HOLDING: The court of appeals' judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: The Government has a substantial and important interest
in attracting qualified federal workers and providing for their health.
However, these interests alone are not sufficient to transform an
insurer's contract-derived claim for reimbursement into a costly
federal case.
Gonzales v. 0 Centrol Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,
126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
LAW: The Government must demonstrate a compelling interest
justifying the substantial burden on a church in restricting their
exercise of religion.
FACTS: After United States Customs' inspectors seized a shipment
of hoasca, a hallucinogen, to the church, the church filed this suit and
moved for a preliminary injunction. The church argued that applying
the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") to their sacramental use of
hoasca violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA"). The government argued that applying the CSA was the
least restrictive means of advancing such compelling governmental
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interests as: (1) protecting church members' health and safety; (2)
preventing the diversion of hoasca from the church to recreational
users; and, (3) complying with the United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. The district court granted relief. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the Government failed to demonstrate
sufficient governmental interest to outweigh the burden on the
church.
ANALYSIS: The arguments of potential harm of the hallucinogenic
substance and diversion are insufficient grounds to justify
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act on the sacramental use
of hoasca. Under the RFRA and its strict scrutiny test, the
Government must meet the burden of demonstrating a compelling
interest which applies to the individual whose sincere exercise of
religion is being restricted.
The fact that Congress classified the hallucinogen under
Schedule I of the CSA does not relieve the Government of its duty to
justify restrictions on religious acts which may infringe on the
RFRA. Here, the Government failed to provide sufficient grounds to
justify the restriction on religious use of hoasca.
HOLDING: The Tenth Circuit's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: Although the sacramental use of a substance may be
potentially harmful and dangerous, the Government still bears the
heavy burden of striking a balance between religious liberty and
advancing compelling Government interests.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Excelsior Coll. v. Bd. of Reistered Nursing, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: The California Board of Registered Nursing had no duty to
the college to continue recognizing its nursing program's coursework
because the Board properly exercised its statutory discretion.
FACTS: Excelsior College established a New York-based nursing
program which enabled students to earn college degrees and to apply
for licensure in California. For over twenty years, the California
Board of Registered Nursing accepted Excelsior's nursing program
as meeting the minimum standards of the Board for licensure under
California Business and Professions Code section 2736(a)(2).
However, after receiving complaints from the Public Health
Nursing Directors that Excelsior's program lacked sufficient
supervised clinical practice, the Board decided that it had no duty to
evaluate out-of-state programs before a nursing program graduate
applies for licensure. Excelsior challenged the Board's refusal to
recognize their program. The trial court sustained the Board's
demurrer to Excelsior's petition for writs of mandate and declaratory
and injunctive relief.
ANALYSIS: Under California Business and Professions Code
section 2736(a)(2), the Board owed no duty to the college to continue
to recognize or accept the coursework of the out-of-state nursing
program. However, the Board has discretion to prospectively
evaluate the program for its own convenience and efficiency.
Additionally, the dormant Commerce Clause argument failed
because graduates from both in-state or out-of-state nursing programs
are similarly assured of licensure in California as long as their
coursework meets the minimum California standards.
Here, Excelsior was not entitled to a writ of mandate because
the Board properly exercised its statutory discretion in refusing to
recognize the nursing program.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: The Board of Registered Nursing effectively exercised
its statutory discretion in refusing to accept the college's program
coursework as meeting California's minimum requirements pursuant
to Bus. & Prof. Code section 2736.
Krontz v. City of San Diego, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: The suspension of the business permit was not an
unconstitutional prior restraint because the permit holder violated
valid regulations. Also, the government had an interest in enforcing
regulations which did not actually infringe on the permit holder's
freedom of speech.
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FACTS: Donald Krontz held a permit to operate a nude
entertainment establishment. The police observed numerous
violations of the "no touch" and "six foot" rules under Mun. Code
section 33.3609 and notified Krontz of the violations. His permit
was suspended for ten days and Krontz was informed of his right to
an administrative hearing.
Krontz filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus
challenging the suspension of his permit. The superior court denied
the petition.
ANALYSIS: Krontz failed to dispute that he violated numerous
regulations, and did not argue that the ordinance lacked necessary
procedural safeguards. Thus, his claim focused on the basis of the
punishment and not on a prior restraint.
The regulation involved was content-neutral as to the time,
place and manner restrictions. The court found that the regulation
was sufficiently narrow that it did not infringe expressive conduct,
which in this case was nude dancing. Thus, the suspension of the
permit did not violate Krontz's due process rights since he was given
ample notice of the violation of the regulations.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: The permit holder's First Amendment rights were not
violated because the government had a valid interest in obtaining
compliance with regulations which were unrelated to the suppression
of speech.
Lieblein v. Shewry, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: The Department of Health Services may revoke an
application for continued enrollment as a Medi-Cal pharmacy
provider for failure to disclose professional discipline.
FACTS: Lieblein submitted an application to the California
Department of Health Services for continued enrollment as a Medi-
Cal pharmacy provider. In his application, Lieblein neglected to state
that the State Board of Pharmacy had recently revoked Lieblein's
license. The Department of Health Services discovered this omission
and denied the application pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code section
14043.2. The Department also barred him from reapplying to the
program for three years.
Lieblein appealed to the Department's Office of
Administrative Hearings and Appeals arguing that the omission was
inadvertent because his employee filled out the application for him.
The appeal was denied. He then filed a petition for writ of mandate,
and the trial court denied the petition.
ANALYSIS: Under the Welf. & Inst. Code section 14043.26, the
department is not required to establish that a provider's omission in
an application was intentional, willful, or fraudulent before imposing
sanctions on the provider. The sanctions directly stem from violations
per se of the disclosure provision and apply to both new and existing
applicants.
Furthermore, due process does not require a hearing with live
testimony because the written application is sufficient evidence in an
administrative appeal. Here, the notice of the administrative decision
was found to be adequate and timely.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: Sanctions may be imposed by the Department of Health
Services upon a pharmacy provider for failure to disclose
professional discipline without establishing evidence that the
omission was due to intentional, willful, or fraudulent misconduct.
Coffin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420 (Ct.
App. 2006).
LAW: Under Government Code section 11504, the burden of proof
was on the applicant to establish its eligibility for a liquor license
from the start of the application process until the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control ("Department") made a final
determination.
FACTS: The Barona Tribal Gaming Authority ("Barona") applied
for a general liquor license and was granted an interim license. There
had been numerous protests against the issuance of the license to
Barona. The Sheriffs Department sent the protestors a notice of the
protest hearing stating that the grant of a liquor license would be
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contrary to the public welfare and morals. During the protest
hearing, the Department's Administrative Law Judge ("AL") placed
the burden of proof on the protestors.
The ALJ then granted the liquor license conditioned on
Barona's submission of a signed petition which incorporated various
conditions to satisfy the protestors' concerns. The Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control adopted the ALJ's decision as its own.
The protestors appealed to the Board, which affirmed.
ANALYSIS: A liquor license applicant bears the burden of proof
under Gov. Code section 11504. The applicant must prove its
eligibility for a license from the beginning of the application process
up until the department makes a final determination. Contrary to the
tribal gaming authority's argument, the grant of a conditional license
does not shift the burden of proof to the protestors once the tribal
gaming authority has established a prima facie case providing that it
had good cause to obtain the license.
Accordingly, the department erred in shifting the burden of
proof on the protestors instead of resting it on the tribal gaming
authority throughout the application review process.
HOLDING: The Board's decision is annulled and remanded to the
department for further proceedings.
IMPACT: The burden of proof to provide proof of eligibility for a
liquor license does not shift from the applicant to the protestor.
Rather, the burden rests on the applicant throughout the application
process.
Brierton v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480 (Ct. App.
2006).
LAW: Administrative sanctions, which protect the public from
future conduct, are independent and do not infringe on criminal
sanctions, which punish past misconduct. Hence, the strict
administrative suspension did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine.
FACTS: Brierton was criminally prosecuted for drunk driving
offenses. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, the trial court imposed two
different suspensions, the first for a one year term and the second for
a term of 90 days. Subsequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles
("DMV") suspended Brierton's drivers license for two years under
Vehicle Code section 13352(a)(3) due to the two alcohol related
driving offense convictions. Brierton argued that these sanctions
violated the separation of powers doctrine because they imposed a
different term of suspension than from those that the trial court
imposed in his criminal case. He claimed that in doing so, the
Legislature usurped the sentencing discretion of the trial court.
The trial court denied the Brierton's petition for a writ of
mandate to prevent enforcement.
ANALYSIS: The more stringent administrative suspension does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine under the California
Constitution article III section 3. This doctrine is violated only when
the action of one branch of government materially infringes or
impairs the inherent function of another branch. Furthermore,
administrative sanctions serve to protect the public from future harm,
while criminal sanctions serve to punish past misconduct. Thus, these
two sanctions are wholly independent of each other.
Additionally, although Brierton bargained for favorable
treatment in trial court during his drunk driving case, this does not
affect the administrative sanction under section 13352. Here, Brierton
was aware of the potential administrative sanction when he entered
his plea.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: There is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine
when strict administrative sanctions are imposed in addition to
criminal sanctions.
COLORADO STATE COURT
Harwood v. Senate Majority Fund, L.L.C., 141 P.3d 962 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: Opinion polls which pose neutral questions are not meant to
influence voters to vote a certain way, but rather they are intended to
Fall 2006 Legal Summaries
682 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 26-2
measure public opinion and collect data. These types of polls are not
considered electioneering communication.
FACTS: Senate Majority Fund, L.L.C. ("SMF") hired a polling firm
to conduct a telephone opinion poll to gauge public opinion before
the 2004 election. The polling firm conveyed the poll results and
provided information regarding the chance of a candidate's success,
key issues and developing trends. SMF used this information to
formulate a political strategy and decide how to allocate funds for
radio advertisements and direct mailings.
SMF reported its contributions and expenditures to the
Colorado Secretary of State pursuant to the Campaign and Political
Finance Amendment XXVIII ("Amendment"). However, they did
not include the payment to the polling firm for the previous opinion
poll.
Harwood claimed that SMF's failure to disclose this
information constituted an electioneering communication. After the
hearing, the administrative law judge held that the opinion poll was
not an electioneering communication because it was made in the
regular course and scope of business. Thus, the opinion poll was an
exception to the Amendment. The ALJ refused to impose civil
penalty on SMF.
ANALYSIS: Under the Amendment, electioneering communication
is defined as:
any communication broadcasted by television or
radio, printed in a newspaper.. that (1)
unambiguously refers to any candidate; and (2) is
broadcasted, printed, mailed, delivered, or distributed
within thirty days before a primary election or sixty
days before a general elections; and (3) is broadcasted
to, printed in a newspaper distributed to, mailed to,
delivered by hand to, or otherwise distributed to an
audience that includes members of the electorate for
such public office.
Here, polling firms transmitted, interchanged, expressed, and
exchanged facts, information, thoughts, or opinions to companies
who hired them. The Amendment was primarily adopted because the
electorate was concerned with regulating, not opinion polls, but
rather the speech that was intended to influence the outcome of the
elections. The opinion polls were not designed to influence voters or
sway public opinion. Instead the polls proposed neutral questions to
collect data and measure public opinion. Accordingly, the court held
that the poll was not electioneering communication.
HOLDING: The Division of Administrative Hearings order is
affirmed.
IMPACT: The Colorado electorate intended the Amendment to
regulate communication that influenced the outcome of elections.
Since there was no electoral advocacy involved during the opinion
polls, the polls thus fall outside the scope of electioneering
communication.
ILLINOIS STATE COURT
Jones v. Cahokia Unit Sch. Dist. No. 187, 845 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006).
LAW: An administrative appeal may properly be dismissed for
failure to timely serve and name the proper defendants.
FACTS: A tenured teacher failed to name the Illinois State Board of
Education and its hearing officer as proper defendants. He also failed
to serve the defendants within the 35 day limit pursuant to the
Administrative Review Law ("Law"). The circuit court dismissed
the administrative review action. The teacher then appealed the
dismissal of his action.
ANALYSIS: The circuit court's decision is reviewed de novo
because this case only presents a question of law. The Illinois School
Code states that when a local school district terminates a tenured
teacher for cause, it must first serve the teacher with written notice of
the charges which led to the termination. Also, if the teacher requests
a hearing, one must be afforded.
The Illinois State Board of Education decides all claims
arising under the School Code. When a discharged teacher requests a
hearing, the district must notify the State Board, who then provides a
list of impartial hearing officers. Once an officer is chosen, this
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officer holds the hearing and renders the final decision. This decision
is final unless review is sought under the Administrative Review
Law.
The Law requires that once a complaint is filed, the plaintiff
must serve and name the defendants. Here the teacher failed to name
the State Board and its hearing officer as defendants in his original
complaint. Since the teacher failed to comply with the provision of
the Law, his claims for administrative review were dismissed.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: An administrative review action may be dismissed if an
appellant fails to timely serve and name the defendants who would be
affected by the decision.
MARYLAND STATE COURT
Fowler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 906 A.2d 347 (Md. 2006).
LAW: In order for the appellate court to perform its reviewing
function, an administrative law judge's decision must contain full,
complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FACTS: The driver was stopped by an officer and was asked to
perform a field sobriety test. The driver performed poorly on the test
and subsequently refused to submit to a preliminary breath test. The
officer arrested him for drunk driving based on his performance on
the sobriety tests. At the police station, the officer provided the
driver with a DR- 15 Advice of Rights form which advised the driver
of the consequences for refusing or failing a chemical breath test and
to certify that the officer complied with the statute's advice of rights
requirements. Both the officer and the driver signed this form.
The driver's license was then suspended and he requested a
hearing to contest the suspension. He also filed a motion to subpoena
the arresting officer to support his claim that he was not advised fully
of the sanctions for refusing to take the chemical breath test. At the
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("AL") denied the driver's
subpoena request.
ANALYSIS: The Court found that the ALJ was faced with
conflicting evidence regarding the officer's written certification in
the DR- 15 Advice of Rights form and the testimony from the arrested
driver. Additionally the administrative record lacked specific or
explicit statements indicating whether the ALJ accepted or rejected
the driver's testimony. Thus, the appellate court was unable to
perform its function.
Furthermore, the denial of the subpoena request was
inappropriate because there were factual disputes surrounding
whether the driver was accurately advised of the consequences of
refusing the breath test or whether he was misled by the officer's
statements. Therefore, the basis for the rejection of the subpoena
request was not apparent.
HOLDING: The circuit court judgment is denied and remanded.
IMPACT: When there is insufficient evidence indicating whether
the ALJ accepted or rejected testimony or other evidence, the appeals
court is unable to properly perform its reviewing function.
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